Military machine-Industrial Complex

While traditional MIC players make money whether their host country finds itself at war or at peace, news corporations, companies providing services to the war machine in the field, and structure contractors demand wars to make military-related profits.

From: Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict (2d Edition) , 2008

Military–Industrial Complex, Organization and History

Gregory Hooks , in Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict (Second Edition), 2008

The war machine–industrial circuitous (MIC) has never been a neutral term. Dwight Eisenhower coined the term MIC in 1961 during his farewell address to warn the nation of a looming danger. The threat to republic has been a recurrent theme in many studies of the MIC since Eisenhower'south warning, including works by Gordon Adams, Sydney Lens, Ann Markusen and Joel Yudken, and Seymour Melman. At a descriptive level, the MIC refers to military agencies and firms that produce military goods. In add-on a number of political and economic actors are too dependent on the defense program and are included in the MIC including legislators, workers, and businesses that serve and depend upon the military market. Although the term was coined with specific reference to the United States information technology has been extended to identify industrialized armed services establishments in other times and places. This commodity will describe the firms, agencies, and institutions that comprise the MIC and will consider the dangers posed past this concentration of economic and military ability.

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Military–Industrial Circuitous, Contemporary Significance

Daniel P. Ritter , Gregory McLauchlan , in Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict (2nd Edition), 2008

The term "military–industrial circuitous" (MIC) was famously introduced to the American public in 1961 past President Dwight Eisenhower in his adieu address. The former general, who was well aware of the growing military machine industry, warned his beau countrymen of the tremendous influence such an establishment could have in a highly militarized society. During the common cold state of war the MIC constituted a significant locus of power and today its might is perchance fifty-fifty greater. This article examines the contemporary significance of the military–industrial complex by tracing its development over the past few decades.

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Militarism

Arden Bucholz , Rennison Lalgee , in Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict (2d Edition), 2008

The Military–Industrial Complex

The proper origin of the MIC is in the pre-1914 cold war world of Deutschland and Japan. Both attained world-power status by simultaneously modernizing their militaries and their industrial bases. Both created novel systems or combinations of organizations and institutions that cooperated instead of competing: big business, universities, authorities bureaucracies, and the military. The human relationship between these agencies was galvanized by the two world wars but it did not reappear in either country afterwards 1945 primarily considering, as defeated nations, their armies were initially airtight downwardly by the victors, and then proscribed or strictly limited by the ensuing civilian governments. It is ironic that later 1945 their major antagonists, the U.s. and Soviet Russia, in a sense took up where Federal republic of germany and Nihon had left off and continued and strengthened these relationships during the Cold War. When Dwight Eisenhower took office in 1953, for example, 70% of American federal spending went to the military machine.

Although in 1953 Dwight Eisenhower sought 'maximum security at minimum cost and without danger to costless institutions' by reorganizing the U.s. defense establishment, by 1961 he had once more returned to the classic theme with which this commodity began. Almost to retire from part, he spoke of the dangers of the MIC. He cautioned that Americans must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted military influence, whether sought or unsought, because the potential for a disastrous rise of misplaced power existed and information technology would persist. Subsequently a historian noted that America was a country in which institutions and men who possessed military, economic, and political power had become and then intertwined that they had merged; a similar sentiment echoed in C. Wright Mills' The power elite.

Key features here include sophisticated weapons that are continually condign obsolete and constantly replaced by the next generation, an elaborate publicity arrangement, a burgeoning federal defense budget, armed forces contractors in the private sector, and the menstruation of retired officers from active duty to defense contractors, lobbyist groups, and congressional committees. In both the Korean and Vietnam wars, defense force budgets again rose past the halfway marker for American expenditures. However, except for communist ideologs, few labeled the U.s. militaristic, perhaps because Truman fired MacArthur and Lyndon Johnson fired himself when these wars began to verge out of control. Yet any realistic exam of the American upkeep, the defense contractors, and other institutions of life such as the disastrous McCarthy matter, the civil defence force organizations, or the extra-governmental agencies might conclude that American culture was clearly in danger of domination past armed services goals and methods, technology and expenditure, and ideals and models.

Commencement with Ronald Reagan's presidency, the United States began an aggressive policy of armed services spending. President Reagan in an endeavour to come across the 'Soviet threat' called for 'rearming America'. Claiming that the Soviet Matrimony had outspent the U.s.a. on arms by several hundreds of billions of dollars since 1970, President Reagan began a dramatic shift of taxpayers' money away from nonmilitary spending toward military spending.

Nearly of the dramatic increase in Pentagon budgets came early in President Reagan's start term. At first, the beneficiaries of war and militarism were happy with these hikes in the Pentagon spending. But every bit President Regan appeared to 'soften' in his second term and with the Common cold War coming to an terminate, Usa militarism needed redefining from Soviet containment to something global.

One way to justify increased military machine spending in the post-Cold War world is to search for or invent threats to national security: rogue states, axis of evil, global terrorism, and militant Islam. The attacks on nine/eleven provided the opportunity for the U.s. to increase spending for war. Ismael Hossein-zadeh argues that had the attacks been viewed as crimes, it would have "required criminal prosecution through coordinated international intelligence-gathering operations, constabulary enforcement actions, and public affairs actions." Instead, seen as acts of war against America or against freedom and democracy, it established that America was at state of war: justifying military buildup and military assailment.

Retired United states of america Administrator Ronald I. Spiers sees terrorism as tool or tactic, as a method of carrying out politics by other means. How does one win a war confronting an brainchild? It is a self-perpetuating process that feeds the needs of militarists and has no end in sight. Hossein-zadeh states that "nether capitalism, actual wars are needed in society to generate 'sufficient' demand for war-dependent industries and their profitability requirements." He believes that more driving the war today, information technology "underscores U.South. militarists' constant search for enemies or new 'threats to our national security'."

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Intelligence: Organizational

S.R. Clegg , T.F. Clarke , in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2001

two Contemporary Views of Organizational Intelligence

Wilensky'south (1967 ) view of organizational intelligence was informed largely by big, US military machine-industrial circuitous organizations. The picture inverse dramatically during the 1980s, as learning from Japan became the watchword. Japanese organizations were still bureaucracies—but learning bureaucracies. What they were oriented to learning was continuous comeback of quality—and information technology was this that became seen as the nub of their specific organizational intelligence—learning non just to do existing things amend but as well to be better at innovation. The key involved unlocking full organizational intelligence rather than refining strategic intelligence (see Innovation: Organizational ). Thus, the metaphors of intelligence shifted from defense to commerce (see Organizations, Metaphors and Paradigms in ).

Using smart machines and robots for more routine work, Japanese manufacturers tried to create smarter workers for meliorate products (encounter Applied science and Organization ). Organizations sought to develop relational contracts based on similar philosophies of continuous comeback as were applied in manufacturing (run across Alliances and Joint Ventures: Organizational ). Intensified global competition and the development of new digital technologies became the drivers that saw the lessons from Nippon become widely distributed in existing industry, especially in the United States and Europe, by the end of the 1980s. The knowledge based information economy had arrived in which creativity, intelligence, and ideas were the cadre capability for sustainable success.

New information and advice technologies are crucial to such innovation processes, helping to globalize production and speed up the diffusion of technology. Information engineering science and globalization are transforming organizational concepts of time and infinite. The convergence of computing power and telecommunication attain is providing new technological and information resources in a global, digital globe. Every bit Hamel and Prahalad (1994) insisted, against Wilensky's (1967) view of entrenched structures, size, and centralization as strategic assets, such assets go liabilities when organization competitiveness is based on radical, nonincremental innovation (see Strategy: Organizational ).

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Defense and Security Economics

Rémy Herrera , in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (2nd Edition), 2015

Toward Alternative Interpretations

In the industry of armament equipment, the economic weight of the private enterprises in the military–industrial complex was already considerable at the cease of WWII. In the 1950s, U.s. President Dwight D. Eisenhower felt compelled to warn his fellow citizens against the increasing threat posed by the collusion of interests of this industry, big business concern, and the army (see Eisenhower's Farewell Address to the Nation on 17 January 1961). During the conflict in Vietnam, many private large corporations were integrated into the war effort; among them were DynCorp, Halliburton, Vinnell, Lockheed Martin, and General Dynamics. Today, the main suppliers of the US Department of Defence are transnational firms involved in shipbuilding, aerospace, and computers, whose military contracts drain off astronomical amounts of federal dollars. Private military companies also provide to the federal states, international institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and other private entities. They provide a very big range of technical services aimed at assisting or supplementing regular military machine in the protection of strategic sites (military bases, oil fields, mines, nuclear facilities, etc.), and in edifice, logistics, military preparation, intelligence, public relations, and the provision of specialized staff (consultants, bodyguards, mercenaries directly involved in combats, etc.).

During the menstruation of the Common cold War, the expansion of the productive forces in the Usa was partly driven past the 'artillery race,' including the evolution of a number of of import associated technological advances, such as ciphering systems, robots controlled past computers, and, more than recently, the Internet. Nowadays, the The states defence force budget remains big, at near v.0% of GDP and 45% of the world military expenditures. Moreover, the armed services–industrial complex continues to play a key role, just it now functions under the control of high finance. As a matter of fact, in the military sector in the 2000s, the share of the ownership capital held by institutional investors that were themselves controlled by the biggest financial oligopolies reached approximately 95% of the total avails of Lockheed Martin, 75% of those of General Dynamics, 65% of Boeing, and so on. A similar development occurred to the private military companies, with an increasing share of their capital falling nether the thumb of high finance. Indeed, Military Professional Resource Inc. (MPRI) was bought by L-iii Communications, Vinnell by Carlyle, and DynCorp past Veritas.

At this stage, one may wonder whether crisis and war are intertwined. From a Marxist point of view, war would be economically integrated into the capitalist cycles as an farthermost form of uppercase destruction (or devalorization). At the same time, and in a context of accentuation of the internal contradictions of commercialism, it would serve politically to reproduce the conditions for maintaining command by the dominant fractions of the ruling classes, that is to say, high finance, over the capitalist world system.

These observations revitalize theories of imperialism, for which the use of armed force is a strategy imposed by finance as the means of reproduction of its power, and where militarization is the essential modality of the beingness of capitalism. In such a context, the function of the country becomes absolutely crucial to capital, since information technology is the state that goes to war on behalf of capital.

Military spending has become a major source of turn a profit for the capitalists, in particular because information technology can transform productive capital – particularly when information technology is financed by public debt – into fictitious capital. In add-on, it should be observed that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were launched in a time of crisis (2001–03, every bit the years 1913 and 1938 were too); a crisis that emerged along with budgetary policy changes occurred in connection with the worsening of the internal and external deficits in the U.s., partly because of the demand to finance its war endeavour as a global hegemony.

The question then is whether the The states could revitalize uppercase aggregating in the center of the world system past wars. Some reply no, insofar every bit the destruction of (constant and variable) capital caused by these conflicts, which are dramatic for the countries that suffer from them, would be insufficient to promote a new long cycle of upper-case letter expansion in the United States, equally was the case in the mail service-WWII flow. Such wars would also be bereft when ane takes into business relationship the associated furnishings of constructive demand, mostly active in the short term, and the technological effects, which are positive only for the military–industrial sector. Insufficient, unless mod imperialist wars expand and become permanent.

Under these circumstances, it would definitively be hopeless to endeavour to build, as the neoclassical mainstream is attempting, an 'economics of war,' or even a defence and security economics, without politics (Herrera, 2013).

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The military machine and the environment: The neglected core barrier

Chenaz B. Seelarbokus , in International Environmental Cooperation and The Global Sustainability Capital Framework, 2021

eight.1 The military industry

The full implications of the military have been succinctly captured by what President Eisenhower chosen the "military machine-industrial complex," understood to exist a "conjunction of an immense military machine establishment and a large artillery industry" (see Singer and Derrick Hodge, 2010a, p. 5). Besides to be considered are the international arms transfers, and the current context of an arms race which capitalizes not only on the quantity of artillery but likewise on the greater subversive potential of the artillery (United nations, 1983). The globe military expenditure in 2015 was $1.67 trillion, constituting 2.3% of the global Gdp, and representing "the outset increase in world military spending since 2011" (Perlo-Freeman et al., 2016). In 2016, earth military machine spending rose to $1.69 trillion, 8 while the upkeep for Un peacekeeping operations for the fiscal year 2017–2018 was $6.9 billion. 9 As at 2019, the earth armed forces expenditure stood at $one.92 trillion, deemed to exist "the highest level since 1988" (Tian et al., 2020 p.1).

The US maintains its position as the major spender, with a military expenditure of $732 billion in 2019, representing 38% of the global full (Tian et al., 2020, p. 3). In the period 2006–2015, the The states, UK, France, Japan, and Italian republic had a negative growth in their armed forces expenditures, while Cathay, Saudi Arabia, Russian federation, Republic of india, Germany, Republic of korea, Brazil, Australia, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) witnessed a positive growth (see Fig. viii.1).

Fig. 8.1

Fig. viii.1. Share and pct modify in earth military expenditures for the top 15 spenders for the period 2006–2015.

 Source: Based on data compiled from SIPRI Fact Sheet, April 2016 (Perlo-Freeman et al., 2016, pp. 2, 3).

The U.s.a. Section of Defense (DOD) has typically received more than one-half of federal R&D funding annually, and this for more than two decades (National Science Board, 2016, pp. 3–six). In 2013, the defense force departments of France, Deutschland, United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland, and Nihon, represented half-dozen.3%, 3.vii%, 15.9%, and four.half-dozen% of their respective governmental budgets (National Science Board, 2016, pp. 4, 88–xc). In 2009, the federal budget for defense R&D was 52% in the US, 28% in France, 18% in the UK, 17% in Republic of korea, and less than 6% in Germany and Nippon (National Scientific discipline Board, 2012, National Scientific discipline Board, 2016, pp. 78–79). Typically, the military machine R&D programs of the DOD are outsourced to private concern companies, which are tasked with weapons production and other military machine applications, and which also exert a significant role in advocating for specific production programs (Weimar, 2009, Reppy and Long, 1978, p. 38).

In terms of the international trade in arms, the value of all artillery transfer agreements worldwide was $71.eight billion in 2014 (Theohary, 2015, p. three). In 2014, the US was the leader in global artillery transfer agreements, accounting for 50.4% of all such agreements, valued at $36.2 billion (Theohary, 2015, p. three). Russian federation was the second next, accounting for 14.two% of the artillery transfer agreements (worth $10.2 billion). Thus, the Usa and Russia accounted for 64.6% of all international artillery transfer agreements in 2014 (Theohary, 2015, p. 3). Tables eight.1 and viii.2 show the top exporters (with an almanac export value of at least US 100 million) and top importers (with an annual import value of at to the lowest degree U.s.a. 100 one thousand thousand) of pocket-size artillery and light weapons for the years 2002–2012 respectively.

Tabular array 8.1. Meridian exporters of minor arms and lite weapons.

Yr Meridian exporters (in descending order of export value)
2002 US, Italia, Brazil, Germany, Kingdom of belgium, Russia, Cathay
2003 Russian federation, The states, Italy, Deutschland, Brazil, China
2004 US, Italy, Germany, Brazil, Austria, Belgium, Prc
2005 U.s., Italy, Federal republic of germany, Belgium, Austria, Brazil, Russia, Red china
2006 Usa, Italy, Germany, Brazil, Austria, Belgium
2007 US, Italian republic, Federal republic of germany, Brazil, Austria, Belgium, U.k., Mainland china, Switzerland, Canada, Turkey, Russia
2008 The states, Italy, Federal republic of germany, Brazil, Switzerland, Israel, Austria, South korea, Belgium, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Norway, Canada
2009 Usa, Italia, Germany, Brazil, Republic of austria, Nippon, Switzerland, Russia, France, South Korea, Belgium, Spain
2010 United states, Federal republic of germany, Italy, Brazil, Switzerland, Israel, Republic of austria, Russia, South Korea, Sweden, Belgium, Spain
2011 US, Italian republic, Germany, Brazil, Austria, Switzerland, Israel, Russia, Due south Korea, Belgium, China, Turkey, Spain, the Czech republic
2012 US, Italy, Germany, Brazil, Austria, South korea, Russia, China, Kingdom of belgium, the Czech Republic, Turkey, Norway, Nihon

Information compiled from Grimmett, R.F., Kerr, P.K., 2012. Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004–2011. Congressional Inquiry Service (CRS). seven-5700. fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R42678.pdf; Theohary, C.A., 2015. Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007–2014. Congressional Inquiry Service. world wide web.crs.gov. R44320.

Tabular array 8.2. Top importers of small arms and light weapons (in descending order important value).

Year Summit importers (in descending order of import value)
2002 The states, Republic of cyprus, Saudi arabia, South Korea
2003 Us, Cyprus, Germany
2004 The states, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Arab republic of egypt, France, the Netherlands
2005 US, Saudi arabia, Canada, France, Deutschland
2006 US, French republic, Japan, Canada, Republic of korea, Germany, Australia
2007 The states, UK, Canada, French republic, Federal republic of germany, Spain
2008 US, Canada, UK, Federal republic of germany, Commonwealth of australia, France, Pakistan
2009 Us, UK, Saudi Arabia, Australia, Canada, Federal republic of germany, France
2010 US, United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland, Canada, Germany, Australia, South Korea, France, Thailand
2011 U.s., Canada, Deutschland, Australia, Thailand, UK, France, Italy
2012 U.s.a., Canada, Deutschland, Commonwealth of australia, French republic, Britain, Thailand, Indonesia

Data compiled from Grimmett, R.F., Kerr, P.K., 2012. Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004–2011. Congressional Inquiry Service (CRS). 7-5700. fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R42678.pdf; Theohary, C.A., 2015. Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007–2014. Congressional Research Service. www.crs.gov. R44320.

Except for 2003 (when Russia was the topmost exporter), the The states has consistently been both the greatest exporter and importer of small artillery and light weapons for the years 2002–2012. The developing nations, known to possess the greatest "potential for the outbreak of regional military conflicts," "continue to be the main focus of foreign artillery sales activity by conventional weapons suppliers" (Grimmett and Kerr, 2012, p. 1, Theohary, 2015). In 2011 and 2014, the artillery transfer agreements to developing nations constituted 83.9% and 86% respectively of all arms transfer agreements made worldwide (Grimmett and Kerr, 2012, p. 3, Theohary, 2015, p. 1), with the US beingness the lead supplier and Russian federation being in second place. From 2011 to 2014, the US made close to $115 billion in such agreements, and Russian federation fabricated $41.7 billion.

In 2011, the US delivered weapons to the developing nations amounting to $10.5 billion (37.6% of all such deliveries), and Russia delivered weapons worth $seven.5 billion (26.8%). In the same year, Saudi Arabia made arms transfer agreements with the US to the melody of $33.4 billion (Grimmett and Kerr, 2012). During the period 2004–2011, Saudi arabia was the largest artillery purchaser among all developing nations, effecting artillery transfer agreements worth $75.7 billion (Grimmett and Kerr, 2012, p. xv). Israel is the "largest per capita exporter of weapons," reaching a superlative of $7 billion by 2012, and also becoming one of India'due south top iii arms suppliers (Oppenheimer, 2015, p. 49, 51). The US has appropriated more than $i.2 billion for Israel's Atomic number 26 Dome since 2011, separate from the almanac amount of $iii.i billion for Israel to buy weapons (Oppenheimer, 2015, p. l).

As gruesome as it may audio, the concept of competition is not inimical to the sale of weapons. Information technology is acknowledged, regrettably but as a matter-of-fact occurrence, that the leading weapons suppliers have to compete to sell their weapons. Oppenheimer (2015, p. 49), for example, states that "When marketing their products abroad, Israeli defence companies have the advantage of challenge they accept been tested in actual gainsay." The contest targets key developing nations, especially the most affluent amid them, such every bit the oil-producing states, which are deemed to represent fertile basis (Grimmett and Kerr, 2012, p. vii). As a 2015 Congressional Service Enquiry written report notes (Theohary, 2015, p. 4, also Grimmett and Kerr, 2012, pp. 4, 5):

As new arms sales accept become more difficult to conclude in the face of economic factors, competition among sellers has increased. A number of weapons-exporting nations are focusing not simply on the clients with which they have held historic competitive advantages due to well-established military-support relationships, but also on potential new clients in countries and regions where they have not been traditional arms suppliers. As the overall market for weapons has stagnated, artillery suppliers have faced the challenge of providing weapons in type and price that can create a competitive edge. To overcome the key obstacle of express defense budgets in several developing nations, arms suppliers accept increasingly utilized flexible financing options, and guarantees of counter-trade, co-product, licensed product, and co-associates elements in their contracts to secure new orders.

The desire of the Swiss regime to "guarantee the production chapters of the Swiss defense force manufacture, which has been struggling partially due to strict restrictions on the export of war material" prompted the Swiss government to announce in June 2018 that it would relax restrictions on the sale of weapons such that weapons could now exist exported to countries in the midst of civil wars. 10 However, this annunciation generated a strong pop backfire, and the Swiss authorities reversed its decision in October 2018. 11 Popular resistance confronting this planned sale gained momentum and more the mandated 100,000 signatures for a popular vote on the upshot was secured in July 2019. 12

The armed services-industrial complex also exhausts huge human and intellectual capital. Verbal figures on the number of scientists involved in military R&D are hard to find. In June 1978, the UNGA requested the UNSG to bear out a study with a group of governmental experts on the relationship between disarmament and development. This Un Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Evolution met from September 1978 to August 1981, with the following three mandates: "(a) present-day utilization of resources for military purposes; (b) economic and social consequences of a standing arms race and of the implementation of disarmament measures; and (c) conversion and deployment of resource released from war machine purposes through disarmament measures to economic and social development purposes" (UNGA, 1981, pp. 2, 7).

However, every bit noted by Inga Thorsson, Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Diplomacy, Sweden, and Chair of the United nations Grouping of Governmental Experts, it was "impossible" for the Group to fulfill the showtime mandate more often than not due to the fact that countries "provide very little data" (Thorsson, 1982, p. 42). The 1981 Report of the UN Group notes that the mental attitude of "secrecy" in relation to the "generation and broadcasting of information on armed forces activities" perpetuates the arms race (UNGA, 1981 par. 107, p. 45). Notwithstanding, the UN Group estimated that globally more than l million people were directly or indirectly engaged in military activities, including at to the lowest degree five million directly involved in weapons production, and effectually 500,000 scientists and engineers participating in military R&D (Thorsson, 1982, p. 42, UNGA, 1981 pars. 110, 116, 118, pp. 47, 48, 49, encounter likewise World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, Chapter 5, Section II, par. 28).

Other early on reports, such as the 1980 UNEP's Almanac Review, places these estimates at effectually 60 1000000 people being and so engaged in military or related occupations, and around 400,000 scientists (constituting around xl% of globe scientists) working in military R&D. The atomic flop tests conducted past the US between 1951 and 1963 involved more than 200,000 people, "including soldiers, sailors, air crews, and noncombatant exam personnel" (ACHRE, 1995, p. 455). Co-ordinate to the Science and Applied science Indicators, the DOD employed 43% and 46% of the federal scientific discipline and technology workforce in 2012 and 2016 respectively (National Scientific discipline Board, 2012, pp. iii–24, National Science Board, 2016, pp. 3–42). Around xx,000 people are employed in US'due south nuclear weapons program (Gronlund et al., 2014, p. 37).

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Militarism

Anna Stavrianakis , in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (2nd Edition), 2015

Militarism as Excessive Influence

A fourth definition is of militarism equally the excessive influence of either the institution of the state military or of the MIC. The former is feature of a civil–military relations approach, of which there are various strands. These include a US-focused literature on the rise of a standing army post-WWII (eastward.k., Lasswell, 1950; Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960); and the Cold War concern with the role of the armed forces equally a potential modernizing force in and then-chosen 'new nations' (e.g., Huntington, 1968; Janowitz, 1977; Pye, 1962). The literature on the developing earth initially more often than not focused on coups, but afterward shifted to a broader spectrum of armed forces influence, because of the observation that the military machine tin can be powerful fifty-fifty if information technology does not seize power directly.

In that location is fence as to whether information technology is the characteristics of the military itself, or society, that are the more than important variable in understanding militarism. Still, the civil–military relations approach as a whole rests on the problematic thought of an 'equation,' with the armed services on one side and civilian institutions and procedures on the other (Valenzuela, 1985). Simply the civilian side is not just another institution; the military is an thespian within a social and political organization, not a neutral force exterior its boundaries. The ii 'sides' are thus highly interpenetrated. Civil–armed forces relations discussions of militarism – in which militarism occurs when the 'residual' tilts too far in favor of the military – are thus limited by a conceptual separation between armed services and lodge that obscures the grounding of military power in social relations.

Literature on the MIC starts to overcome this pluralist separation between the military and noncombatant institutions, focusing instead on the shared interests betwixt the military, military industry, acme-level government bureaucrats, and legislators and the influence they exercise on society as a whole. This blazon of approach is more focused on the socioeconomic dimensions of militarism, as compared to the institutional approach of the civil–armed forces relations literature. At that place are a variety of theoretical perspectives in play, but the result of these relationships is variously characterized as coordinated and mutually supportive influence that creates a shared interest in continued military spending (Rosen, 1973: two–3), "a set of commonly shared interests between the armed forces and some major corporations" (Lieberson, 1973: 61), and a "cocky-serving adaptation between corporate elites, authorities bureaucrats, and the military hierarchy" (Moskos, 1972: 4).

The civil–military relations and MIC approaches are both useful means in two detail aspects of militarism – the institutional and the political-economic. But the focus on either institutions or economical relations cannot adequately explicate militarism in its broader sense of the preparation for and comport of organized political violence. In addition, both approaches tend to be nationally based in their explanations. MIC accounts are useful for thinking about the political economic system of militarism, and thus showtime to ground militarism in social relations (due east.k., between arms companies, politicians, and the military); but usually remain focused on national economies, which is problematic given the internationalization of military industry. And ceremonious–armed forces relations approaches accept tended to presume a sovereign nation-state, which is problematic given the internationalization of military power through alliances, foreign armed services training, artillery transfers, and then on. These processes challenge the bones supposition that the cardinal explanatory variables (military and domestic political process) are located within national societies (Valenzuela, 1985).

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Soviet Studies: Surroundings

C.E. Ziegler , in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2001

This article examines Soviet and postcommunist Russian approaches to the natural environment. Stalinist economic development programs, agricultural collectivization, the primacy of the heavy industrial–military complex, and an obsession with extreme secrecy led to ecology disasters on a massive scale. Major issues include h2o and air pollution from industry, soil degradation, overuse of pesticides and herbicides, and radioactive contamination from free energy and military sectors. Central planning and country ownership did not forbid environmental degradation by internalizing external costs, but contributed to a crisis state of affairs past undervaluing scarce natural resource. Communist authoritarianism, Marxist–Leninist ideology, and a weak civil society obscured the scope of Soviet environmental problems, and constrained possible solutions. Environmental activism fueled nationalism under Gorbachev, as minorities accused Moscow of exploiting the national republics' territory and resources and demanded greater independence. Public interest in ecology issues waned with the collapse of the Soviet Matrimony; economical decline has shifted public attention toward meeting more immediate material needs. Political paralysis, heart–periphery conflicts, and massive budget deficits have severely constrained efforts to address the legacy of environmental destruction, leaving the population with widespread health problems and the industrialized world's highest mortality and morbidity rates.

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Political Economic system of Violence and Nonviolence

William Gissy , in Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict (Second Edition), 2008

The Political Economic system of the Military machine Establishment

Equally he neared the terminate of his second presidential term Dwight Eisenhower expressed regret over the costs of containing the global expansion of communism, describing the associated arms race as a course of theft from those who lacked food and clothing. At the time there existed a large defense sector as well every bit a sector devoted to weapons development and production. Eisenhower referred to this combination as the Military–Industrial Complex (MIC) and he feared that this post World War Ii miracle could itself become a threat to our liberties and autonomous processes. Some scholars also consider MIC to be a threat to the complimentary market process.

Although MIC appeared to be a passing phase at the end of the Common cold State of war, the 9/eleven attacks and the advent of the never-ending 'war on terrorism' allowed for a resurgence that rivals Common cold War levels. The $447.iv billion defense upkeep for 2006 fabricated the US defence force sector a state within a state in that the corporeality exceeded the GDP of several smaller European nations. It also represents 21% of the federal budget. Additionally in 2006, The Section of Defense employed 2.143 1000000 people and private defense contractors employed iii.6 meg workers. The combined 5.743 million workers correspond 3.8% of the labor strength.

The threat to the autonomous procedure exists considering MIC evolves into a rigid hierarchical structure, authoritarian in nature with no outside input. The revolving doors between the military and major defense contractors as well as promilitary recall tanks and congressional staffs, create a closed network with a single mindset, maintaining a permanent war economy. This war economy is a state-run economy with severe bureau problems where decisions are based upon networking interests so that the resource allotment of resources to military production exceeds the socially efficient level. Procurement decisions are made by those representing the state but who deed in accordance to their personal interests. Increased procurements today will enhance the conclusion maker's opportunity for postmilitary employment with the defense force contractor. This results in excessive procurement levels that help to enrich the defense contractor. For case between March 2003 and September 2006 shareholder returns for major defense contractors increased from 68% to 164%.

In that location is also strain on the economy since the resources allocated to the production of weapons can not exist allocated towards the production of communication, transportation, or capital infrastructure, health or educational services also as bones consumer needs. When the economy is at full employment an increase in military production can only exist obtained by reducing the production of something else. While information technology is true that an increase in military machine production tin stimulate an economic system caught in a recessionary gap that same or perhaps improve stimulus can be achieved by building schools, hospitals, parks, roads, and the like.

A 3rd problem associated with the defense establishment is the exposure to take a chance from growing technological power and the stockpiling of weapons incorporating lethal technologies. Lloyd Dumas (1999) noted that globally we averaged a nuclear accident every half-dozen months for a 45-yr flow. Lxxx percentage of reported problems resulted from worker mistake or the use of poorly designed procedures. Boredom leading to a lack of vigilance in maintaining check lists or monitoring controls is one major source of man error. Boredom tin can and then lead to drug and alcohol abuse. Betwixt 1975 and 1990, 27   000 American military machine personnel were removed from duty involving nuclear weapons due to their corruption of alcohol and drugs.

The stockpiling of arsenals of chemical and biological weapons also increases a nation's exposure to terrorist risk. As Dumas notes, right-wing and white supremacist organizations in the United States such every bit Aryan Nation and Minnesota Patriots Council were defenseless with biological toxins they were planning to employ against federal agents. In 1997 Russian officials admitted that 100 suitcases of nuclear bombs had disappeared. In add-on to physical stockpiles of weapons, the existing noesis has go increasingly available to the public at large. The Aum Shinrikyo cult of Nihon launched a serial of nerve gas attacks using the gas sarin that they developed themselves. In 1996, 17 scientists from Los Alamos assembled a dozen homemade nuclear bombs using engineering science available on the shelves of Radio Shack and nuclear fuel bachelor on the black market. Accidents, misunderstandings, and oversights are a normal function of human being life. To believe that we can somehow primary and control engineering especially lethal technology is nothing more arrogance. The defense establishment focuses on what new technologies can practise when often we should consider what they can not practice and rethink if the technology is meaningful.

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Total War, Social Impact of

Sheldon Ungar , in Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict (Second Edition), 2008

The Enduring Consequences of the Nuclear Arms Race

As illustrated above, the moral panics that attended the arms race had potent economical effects. In the United states of america and the Soviet Marriage, and to a bottom extent Uk, the spiraling arms contest created what C. Wright Mills chosen a permanent war economy. Overall, the prove suggests that massive armed forces spending has negative effects on the economy. With the Soviet Union, the diversion of resources from civilian to military production was clearly a gene in the collapse of the nation. Despite the promised technological innovation, the The states (temporarily) fell behind Nihon and West Germany in civilian-oriented technological competition. Where the ending of the Cold War engendered visions of a 'peace dividend' in the U.s.a., many independent armed services analysts concluded that cutbacks to the military upkeep were too irksome and too small-scale. In entrenching a permanent state of war economy, the MIC spread its product tentacles into the vast majority of congressional districts, resulting in widespread local opposition to cutbacks.

If the idea of free enterprise was bent out of shape in the institutionalization of the MIC, the very existence of nuclear weapons (allied with plans to use them and a staggering amount of media coverage) has had a variety of other subtle and not-and so-subtle psychological, political, and social effects. In this context, Victor Sidel, past president of the American Public Health Association, speaks of 'devastation without detonation'. Even without existence used in state of war since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the accumulation of these weapons has left a dark cloud over society.

The psychological furnishings of the nuclear threat are cleverly understated in a once-common bumper sticker: 'Just one nuclear flop can spoil your whole day'. Studies done during the 1980s reveal that many children believed that a nuclear state of war was likely during their lifetimes. Not surprisingly, results also indicate that children viewed the future with uncertainty and unease. Public recognition of the corrosive influence of the arms race probably peaked with the televised broadcast of the film 'The Day After'. Coming during the menstruum when President Reagan spoke loosely about winning a nuclear state of war, parents were advised non to let children scout the film alone and to let them talk over their fears later on. For all that, the psychological effects probably did not approach the sheer terror felt by many of those who experienced the Cuban Missile Crisis during their childhood.

Moral panics require the creation of folk devils, and the vilification of the Soviet Union – an amoral communist land bent on earth domination – reached unprecedented levels. The project and mirror imaging that ensued as each side exaggerated the inherent evil of its opponent poisoned the international political atmosphere and undermined chances for cooperation. Projection also afforded what amounted to paranoid justifications for spiraling weapons programs. President Reagan, for example, tried to justify the MX missile by claiming that the Soviets could launch a first-strike that would destroy about 90% of America's land-based intercontinental missiles. Not but was the 90% figure profoundly exaggerated, but even if it were true, the remaining ten% of these missiles would provide a sufficient second-strike to deter the Soviets. Omitted from these calculations were the other two elements of the American nuclear triad – the missiles on shipping and those on submarines.

The cosmos of a demonic enemy who was ascribed many of the powers of Satan inevitably redounded on the domestic political scene as well. Starting with the hush-hush Manhattan Project, secrecy became a mainstay of the American political organisation. Not only did the armed forces evolve a huge bureaucracy to withhold information, simply both the surveillance of civilians and the creation of misinformation became commonplace activities. At the same time, the need for constant readiness to protect confronting a Soviet preemptive strike gave rise to what has been termed an 'royal presidency'. The delegation of powers to the executive branch coupled with secrecy immune the MIC to thrive without many of the congressional and public checks that are disquisitional to an informed democracy.

Documents declassified subsequent to the end of the Cold War substantiate prior claims that the MIC and the regime frequently deceived the American public. In particular, at that place were systematic embrace-ups of the amounts of radiation troops and the full general public were exposed to as a result of atmospheric nuclear tests in the 1950s and early 1960s. In some instances, high levels of exposure were purposively employed to examination their furnishings. Taken in tandem, Cold State of war secrecy and revelations, coupled with official duplicity in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal, have created a pervasive sense of distrust in national institutions. The civilian militia movement is an extreme response by those who regard the expansion of government powers as a communist-inspired conspiracy. With the end of the Cold War, the military engaged in a chase for new threats and managed to create fear (but not quite panic) over the possibility that rogue states or terrorists could come to possess nuclear weapons. It remains to be seen whether these nuclear wild cards will exist sufficient to justify major new weapons programs as well as farthermost levels of government secrecy.

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